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Abstract 
This article highlights some of the difficulties that accompany any attempt to 
articulate an understanding of forgiveness that is at once coherent, just and desirable.  
Through a close examination of Charles Griswold’s book Forgiveness: A 
Philosophical Exploration, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that 
forgiveness is intrinsically ambiguous, both conceptually and morally.  I argue that 
there is an underlying tension between the concerns that shape the definition, and 
those that are invoked when affirming the good of forgiveness.  Using Charles 
Taylor’s A Secular Age, I then provide some commentary concerning this ambiguity 




Over recent decades, the topic of forgiveness has become an important topic in a 
number of different areas, and for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, a series of articles and 
books treating forgiveness as an explicit topic have been slowly accumulating within 
Anglophone moral philosophy.  These include analytic examinations of the logical 
coherence of the concept (see e.g. Kolnai 1973-4; McGary 1989; Hieronymi 2001; 
Allais 2008), descriptions of forgiveness as a speech act (Haber 1991), as well as 
treatments influenced by the resurgence of virtue ethics (Smith 1997; Griswold 2007).  
Closely related to this is a recent surge of interest in the role of forgiveness in public 
life, prompted to some extent by the prominence of the language of forgiveness in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.  Here forgiveness is a crucial 
junction at which moral, political, social and religious concerns intersect, and a matter 
of interest for public intellectuals (e.g. Govier 2002; Holloway 2002; Murphy 2003).  
Equally important is the attention given to the subject by Jacques Derrida in two 
essays published towards the end of his life, as part of his exploration of themes such 
as gift, justice and responsibility, which have in turn been utilised by theological 
thinkers in diverse ways (Derrida 2001; Milbank; Caputo 2006).  Alongside these 
currents there has, more generally, been an increased theological focus upon 
forgiveness, as a number of theologians have taken the popular interest in forgiveness 
and related issues as an opportunity to demonstrate the relevance and coherence of 
theology in the public sphere.  Whether it is through interaction - with economics 
(Bell 2007), psychology (Watts and Gulliford 2004), reconciliation and conflict 
resolution (Helmick and Peterson 2001) - or as a theological topic in its own right 
(Jones 2005; Bash 2007), the subject of forgiveness has become one way in which 
theology might play an active part in public discourse.  This diverse and steadily 
accumulating body of work suggests that the notion occupies an important and 
perhaps problematic position in contemporary ethical reflection and public discourse.   
Simply put, my interest here is with the way that forgiveness is ambiguous, both 
conceptually and morally.  These two ambiguities are closely entwined, since any 
attempt to bring some conceptual order to the profusion of acts and attitudes that may 
go by the name “forgiveness” involves some level of moral judgement, as I hope to 
explain shortly.  We might well distinguish between what is and is not forgiveness in 
part by judging whether the supposed “forgiveness” is really a veil over something 
more self-interested, cowardly or convenient, as the case may be.  My interest in this 
article is with the significance of this ambiguity.  Should it be regarded as the 
unfortunate consequence of a poorly defined concept, or might there be deeper 
significance hidden here?  For the sake of clarity, I can state at the outset that my 
answers are “no” and “yes”, respectively; forgiveness is ambiguous, and there is 
something important about this.   
The following discussion is an attempt to justify this conclusion. I will try to show 
that a certain amount of moral ambiguity necessarily accompanies forgiveness, 
insofar as forgiveness involves trust, which is risky, and difficult to justify in advance.  
If it is the case that the trust expressed through forgiveness is part of what makes 
forgiveness a part of human flourishing, then it is also part of what makes forgiveness 
problematic.  Firstly, through a close analysis of the contours and inner tensions of 
one particular treatment of forgiveness, I will explore the way in which the attempt to 
present forgiveness without moral ambiguity affects, adversely, the shape the concept 
takes.   Although there are many attempts to provide a comprehensive or direct 
philosophical treatment of the subject, this chapter’s restrictive focus on one particular 
thinker is deliberate, because the intention is to observe what happens in the attempt 
to reason with forgiveness.  The aim here is to witness the dynamics of the 
engagement, in the hope that this will shed some light on the particular challenge that 
forgiveness presents. Secondly, I will use Charles Taylor’s recent book A Secular Age 
to explore the significance of the difficulties encountered in discussing the meaning 
and value of forgiveness publicly. Finally, I will make a few suggestions about how 
the ambiguity of forgiveness may be theologically significant. 
 
Forgiveness and Moral Discernment 
The problem that I am interested in can be illustrated through a fairly trivial example.  
Suppose I approach a co-worker and begin to complain about our boss.  I accuse her 
of consistently unfair treatment of her employers, and suggest that together we 
approach her so as to voice our concerns.  My co-worker is reluctant to participate in 
my indignant protest.  He tells me that my boss is over-worked, under-paid, and under 
considerable pressure from her superiors, not to mention the stress of being a mother 
of four; he then adds that I should probably be “more forgiving”.  I suspect that my 
fellow-worker is either ambitious and eager for approval, or simply afraid of 
confrontation, and his affirmation of “forgiveness” to be either a tactic of self-
advancement or else a veil for cowardice.  Either way, I conclude that the term is in 
need of some clarification and care over its use if it is to be at all helpful.  I decide 
that in this case we cannot, and should not, “forgive” our boss, because her behaviour 
has not been named and challenged;  to simply “forgive” would, in fact, be a 
disservice to others who may be suffering as a result of our boss’s behaviour.  
Whatever it is that is done apart from these steps would not be forgiveness, however 
piously the word may be invoked.   
I would like to make two observations about the example above, which will be 
explored further in what follows.  Firstly, in this case above, it is obvious that the task 
of conceptual clarification is motivated by moral concern: I only begin to sift through 
the ambiguities of the concept because it begins to seem as though in this situation it 
would be somehow wrong or morally weak to forgive, and this seems counter-
intuitive; forgiveness is supposed to be good.  More than this, my moral unease with 
my co-worker’s affirmation of forgiveness helps to shape the process of refining the 
concept; I want a concept that cannot so easily be used in the way that my co-worker 
uses it, or, put differently, one that can be more easily defended against the various 
charges that may be put against it, in this case that it can too-easily be a veil for 
cowardice or a tactic of calculating ambition.  The second will only become clear in 
what follows, but can be briefly stated here.  It seems that my reluctance to “forgive” 
our boss is motivated by a concern for truth, clarity, fair treatment, accountability, and 
so on.  These concerns may well give me a reason to say that in certain situations 
forgiveness is inappropriate or inauthentic, but they do not really explain my belief 
that forgiveness should be affirmed in others.  The words that my co-worker threw 
back at me pointed to the way that forgiveness expresses generosity of spirit and 
demonstrates an understanding of our human imperfection.  I would probably not say, 
however, that I value forgiveness because I value truth, clarity, and fairness.  It seems 
that through the process of discernment that the example above illustrates an 
important difference becomes visible between the sort of concerns that shape the 
process of defining forgiveness, and the sort of concerns that might lead one to affirm 
or value forgiveness in the first place.  The question of how these concerns interact 
will be explored further below. 
  
 
Charles Griswold: Resentment and the Conditions of Forgiveness 
These issues will be explored further through an examination of Charles Griswold’s 
book, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, which is perhaps the most thorough 
direct philosophical treatment of the topic to date.1   
Like most philosophical discussions of the subject, Griswold’s discussion begins 
with an attempt to establish exactly what forgiveness is.2  For Griswold, the key 
question that needs to be addressed is of how forgiveness is related to resentment.  
Although one might initially suppose that forgiveness necessarily conflicts with 
resentment, on Griswold’s account there is no necessary clash between the two: if one 
gets resentment right, one will find oneself able to forgive (when, that is, it would be 
appropriate to do so).  For Griswold, the simplest way of describing forgiveness is as 
“the letting go of resentment for moral reasons” (Griswold 2007, 40).3  This 
description qualifies forgiveness in two ways.  Firstly, since resentment itself is 
explored very thoroughly, and defined clearly, it qualifies what kinds of emotion 
forgiveness can be thought to supersede or let go.  Forgiveness is not concerned 
simply with the giving up of hostility or anger in general, since these may be felt 
regardless of whether there is any judgement associated with them.  Rather, 
forgiveness is the letting go of resentment; an emotion that is specifically concerned 
with judgement, and which, in its time and place, is both beneficial and justified.  
Secondly, and more importantly, to forgive is to let go of resentment for particular 
reasons, and under particular circumstances: “for moral reasons”.  One does not 
forgive if resentment is diminished or disappears for reasons that have little to do with 
one’s judgement of a particular action; for example, if one simply ceases to regard 
someone as worthy of one’s attention, or if - out of concern for one’s own well-being - 
one is able to alter one’s emotional state through therapy, or through constant 
distraction.  These two conditions together mean that authentic forgiveness is the 
embodiment of a nuanced moral sensitivity which includes resentment and the letting-
go of resentment: if one is initially resentful in the wrong way, one does not forgive; if 
one gives up one’s resentment in the wrong way, one does not forgive. 
Griswold begins with the understanding of resentment given in Bishop Butler’s 
sermons: resentment is an “inward witness to virtue” (Griswold 2007, 19-37).  It is a 
reaction aroused by the perception of unwarranted harm, one that includes a 
judgement concerning fairness, that is aimed at the author of an action, that 
instinctively protests and looks for some kind of due punishment or revenge 
(Griswold 2007, 39).  Resentment is how a virtuous person feels and thinks when 
injured: to feel the right kind of anger for the right kinds of reason.  Given this 
positive estimation, the crucial question for Griswold is why one’s tendency to be 
resentful under certain circumstances should be tampered with.  If resentment, when 
properly understood, and not subject to excess, is a moral response, why would there 
be a case for letting go of it?  Griswold’s answer is simple: “[f]orgiveness does not 
attempt to get rid of warranted resentment.  Rather, it follows from the recognition 
that the resentment is no longer warranted.  And what would provide the warrant can 
be nothing other than the right reasons” (Griswold 2007, 43).  In other words, 
forgiveness comes into play when the work of resentment is done.  On Griswold’s 
account, one would be letting go of resentment for the right reasons only if the 
following conditions had been fulfilled by the wrongdoer: condemnation of their own 
behaviour; acceptance of responsibility for it; the experience and expression of regret; 
commitment – demonstrated through action if necessary – to become a different sort 
of person; demonstration that they understand the damage they have done; and 
provision of an account of how it was they came to do whatever it was that they did 
(Griswold 2007, 49-50).4  To learn how to forgive, then, one would have to learn how 
to discern the presence of these criteria, and of course, this is not easy, since contrition 
can be faked for the sake of convenience, and even the most genuine remorse may be 
mixed with a certain amount of self-centred regret (Griswold 2007, 59).  More than 
this, one would have to have a disposition that includes the willingness to give 
forgiveness where these conditions are present, and the severity to withhold it where 
they are not.   
Along with a set of conditions that would need to be met by the victim, these 
conditions make up “paradigmatic forgiveness”; a case of fully realised forgiveness 
(Griswold 2007, 113-7).  Without a change of heart - however incomplete - as a prior 
condition, forgiveness cannot be distinguished from various morally suspect 
responses to wrongdoing - resignation, condonation, excuse, justification, etc.  In fact, 
to “forgive” without any reference to a change of heart on the part of the wrongdoer is 
to neglect their potential, to fail “to hold him or her to his or her best self” (Griswold 
2008, 306).  Forgiveness has to pass through judgement, and since it is a 
fundamentally interpersonal affair, both parties must pass through. 
 So far, then, we can note a number of things. Firstly, Griswold, along with many 
others, is concerned to point out that resentment is an important part of the moral 
landscape, and a sign of our sensitivity to injustice.  Secondly, this concern is linked 
to a suspicion that certain ways of affirming forgiveness put this insight in danger, 
insofar as if one were to encourage the giving up of resentment, one might appear to 
thereby judge the resentful person, or imply that resentment is not a proper moral 
response in the first place (“you should be more forgiving!”).  The real danger, from 
this point of view, is not simply that in isolated instances forgiveness might imply an 
improper and perhaps damaging, surrender of resentment (the attempt to give up 
resentment before resentment has had chance to do its work, so to speak). The real 
danger is more that of an on-going commitment to forgive, or of a well-established 
affirmation that forgiveness is in general a good to be sought, because it is in this way 
that the value of resentment may gradually be lost sight of.  Thirdly, it seems as 
though the concern to protect the insight concerning the intrinsic moral value of 
resentment plays a determining role in the process of forming the concept of 
forgiveness. Just as in the example above about the unfair boss, it seems that certain 
concerns about the possible implications of affirming forgiveness are dominant in 
shaping the account of forgiveness that is given.  In this way, it seems that Griswold 
proposes a conception of forgiveness from which risk has been eliminated, and which 
is without any essential inner conflict.  The assumption here seems to be that when 
forgiveness is understood as “the giving up of (no longer warranted) resentment for 
moral reasons” its virtue should appear clearly, and without ambiguity.  It is this 
assumption that I wish to challenge in what follows. 
  
Affirming Forgiveness 
I previously made two observations about the process of clarifying one’s 
understanding of forgiveness. The first was that certain moral concerns both motivate 
and direct the process. The exposition above demonstrates the way in which this 
operates in Griswold’s work.  The second was that these concerns may be quite 
different in character from the reasons one has for affirming or valuing forgiveness in 
the first place. We need, then, to ask why Griswold holds forgiveness to be valuable.  
Another way of putting this question is to ask what it is that makes forgiveness worth 
all this philosophical labour?  Given the way the concept is liable to slip off into 
morally dubious regions (lax tolerance on one side; irrelevance on the other), why 
should it be retained, let alone affirmed?  For Griswold, the answer is found in the 
way that forgiveness expresses in particular circumstances a number of different but 
related virtues (Griswold 2007, 70).  Forgiveness is underpinned by the ideals of 
“responsibility, respect, self-governance, truth, mutual accountability, friendship, and 
growth” (Griswold 2007, 213).  As we have seen, forgiveness is in some sense 
actually an act of judgement, in that when one forgives one judges not only the 
wrongness of a particular act, but also the character of the wrongdoer’s remorse, 
repentance, apology, etc.  Part of the reason that it is good to forgive, then, is that to 
do so is to express morally nuanced understanding and judgement.    
However, Griswold also gives other, very different, reasons for valuing 
forgiveness, which show that on his account there is still a sense in which forgiveness 
occupies its own unique place in our conceptual landscape, and so should be actively 
affirmed for its own sake.  What do we gain, then, by speaking of forgiveness that we 
could not gain simply through speaking of justice, accuracy and the importance of 
responding appropriately?  Although not clearly spelt out, the sense is that forgiveness 
expresses a level of compassion towards the frailty of “embodied, affective, and 
vulnerable creatures”, a compassion that goes along with our reconciliation with 
imperfection (Griswold 2007, 19 and 110).  The emphasis throughout the book on the 
dangers of perfectionistic modes of ethics, which tend to give rise to an aspiration to 
leave the realm of human interaction and openness (the “circle of sympathy”), 
suggests that for Griswold, forgiveness is a part of our acceptance of our condition - 
an acceptance not always manifest in the formation and communication of ideals.  
Despite the moral concern that motivates and shapes the process of marking out an 
acceptable space for the concept, Griswold is also aware of the role of forgiveness in 
supporting aspects of human existence that exceed the moral horizon: friendships and 
intimate family relationships; the actual living of life, rather than any particular goal 
or duty. 
 Essentially, then, although forgiveness is defended and justified through a very 
careful process of definition, it is actively commended in a rather different way, and 
for different reasons.  The continuing presence of resentment may damage one’s 
capacity for love, compassion and sympathy for others.  To forgive is also to exhibit 
the belief that a future of renewal and growth is possible (Griswold 2007, 70).  In fact, 
Griswold has stated subsequently he wishes the link between forgiveness and the 
possibility for transformation was brought out more strongly in the book (Griswold 
2008, 306).  Despite these comments, the tone of the book, on the whole, is much 
more focused on the care with which the concept must be handled, the way that 
abuses must be foreseen and headed off, the sense that forgiveness needs to be very 
well hemmed in, and qualified, if it is to be of any use.  The concern that shapes the 
account is the concern for security: how can we understand forgiveness so that the 
practice does not become corrupt or complicit with injustice, or a failure of nerve in 
the face of moral outrage?  But the appeal of forgiveness, the thing that means we 
need forgiveness, rather than simply fairness, or nuanced understanding – and the 
reason, importantly, that one would want to be forgiven - is something to do with the 
way that it embodies trust and vulnerability, the willingness to hope, acceptance of the 
imperfect.  What Griswold does not explore in any depth, though, is the way there 
may be conflict between the two, and whether there may be a more basic difficulty in 
reconciling - in life - the capacity for love, compassion and sympathy with an 
unyielding vigilance towards injustice.  But this is, surely, a crucial question, 
especially with regard to the way that forgiveness expresses trust.  At what point does 
our willingness to trust compromise our concern for justice? How do we measure the 
inevitable risk that we take whenever we trust another? Put differently, how do we 
deal with the danger that accompanies our virtues? 
It is important to note here that although Griswold, when defining forgiveness, 
focuses primarily on a discrete act of forgiveness, the sense of caution that pervades 
his book has more to do with the implications of an on-going commitment to 
forgiveness, and of the expression of this commitment in public: what does a 
“forgiving” life produce, encourage, or permit, in oneself or in the life of a 
community?  Griswold states that forgiveness expresses a hopeful commitment to 
certain values: 
 
Forgiveness rests in part, I argued above, on trust that the projected 
narratives about the offender, as well as oneself, will become true.  
Forgiveness is, so to speak, a vote for the victory of such values as 
respect, growth and renewal, harmony of self and reconciliation, 
affection and love.  ... Acting on the basis of these ideals may also have 
a constitutive character, such that treating oneself and the other as 
capable of ethical growth may in itself help to promote that growth. 
(Griswold 2007, 71) 
 
However, what this statement also highlights is the way in which forgiveness 
necessarily eludes the kind of justification that Griswold attempts to provide through 
his careful definition.  If forgiveness is a “vote” for certain values, and has a 
(potentially) constitutive character, then it is, by necessity, a very risky enterprise. 
This riskiness makes the conditions that are supposed to define the act of forgiveness 
far less clear-cut than Griswold seems to suppose, insofar as they all depend to some 
degree on a judgement about a possible future.  The crucial distinction - between 
warranted and unwarranted resentment - is only visible after a judgement concerning 
the future.  In order to assess the authenticity of another’s remorse, resolve, 
understanding, commitment, etc., one must anticipate their future behaviour.  Or 
rather, this is part of what one would actually be doing, if one was “judging” the 
authenticity of remorse, repentance, resolve, etc.  If someone has betrayed me, then in 
testing the authenticity of their repentance, I am test how realistic it is to extrapolate 
from the present moment to a future scenario in which it would be wise to trust them.  
My resentment will only seem to be “no longer warranted” if their repentance seems 
to be genuine, but their resentment will only seem to be genuine if I am no longer 
compelled to imagine them repeating their hostility towards me, or if this possible 
future does not feel likely (see Sussman 2005, 85-107). If my betrayer’s repentance 
does not seem to be genuine, it will – at least in part – be because it is too difficult for 
me to anticipate or imagine a future in which they are loyal.  But our capacity for this 
kind of anticipation, imagination or expectation is not, surely, a matter of simple 
assessment.  In these kinds of situation our evaluation of another is intimately bound 
up, one way or another, with a much more basic sense of our own vulnerability, our 
on-going response to our continual exposure to others, and this sense will be 
inseparable from our own particular histories.  In other words, the judgement we use 
to discern whether we should forgive is already intimately bound up with trust, but 
trust cannot be subject to the same kind of assessment that this attempt to define 
forgiveness aims seems to rest on.  We cannot, surely, know whether treating oneself 
and the other as capable of growth will help to promote that growth, or whether our 
“vote” for respect and renewal will lead to victory or not.  One may vote, in trust, for 
moral growth and yet produce further moral decline, just as one may vote for the 
Liberal Democrats, and find that one has helped to put the Conservatives in power.    
What follows from all this is that the point at which resentment becomes “no 
longer warranted” is not a point that could be located objectively, but must be judged.  
And we do in fact tend to accuse each other of making these sorts of judgements 
badly: trusting those who should not have been trusted, giving second chances where 
they were not warranted, anticipating reform when we should have expected 
continued failure, and so on.  The difficulty here seems to be that on Griswold’s 
account, if one is to forgive well, one must know what to condemn and what to accept, 
as well as how to shift from condemnation and censure to acceptance and trust, and 
when.  Very little is said, however, about the immense difficulty of doing this.  One 
can, on the one hand, be too easily reconciled with imperfection and tolerate injustice; 
one can, on the other, demand, impossibly, that imperfection be eradicated and 
become intolerant of weakness as a result.  It would seem that in order to assess the 
value of forgiveness one already has to know where to “draw the line” between those 
imperfections with which one might justly reconcile oneself, and the violations and 
shortcomings which should only be protested and changed.  One has to already know 
which imperfections to accept and which to reject, or put differently, one has to 
already know how to identify “imperfection”.  But a large part of the difficulty of 
moral judgement and discourse stems from the fact that we do not “know” this; it is 
this that we are trying to get to know. 
It would seem, then, that Griswold’s forgiveness is a tool that only those who are 
at a fairly advanced stage of moral development would be able to use. Forgiveness 
would seem to be a secondary moral exercise, only really appropriate for the well-
practised.  Although space does not permit a thorough discussion of this issue, there is 
an important point to be made here about the difference between the forgiveness that 
Griswold describes and the concept that emerges out of the disparate sayings and 
parables in the gospels.  Although, as Gregory Jones notes, an important difference 
between secular philosophical and theological accounts of forgiveness is found in the 
way that, theologically, forgiveness is meaningful as part of a much broader narrative 
of transformation, involving concrete communal practices through which to “unlearn 
sin (Jones 1995, 207-225), it may be that the more important difference concerns the 
way that in the gospels, the command to forgive goes along with the sense that the 
gospel message is not for the righteous, but for sinners.  The command to forgive is 
assumed to be the kind of command that sinful people can obey, rather than an 
exercise of morally confident judgement.  In fact, this is one of the paradoxes of the 
Christian understanding of forgiveness: forgiveness is not just for sinners to receive, 
but for sinners to give (insofar as one’s own need for forgiveness is one important 
reason to forgive), whilst at the same time it is claimed that to be generous to the 
unworthy is to become perfect as the Father is perfect.5  The practice of forgiveness is 
somehow both a sign of our morally weakened condition and one aspect of the 
perfection towards which one strives.  For Griswold, in contrast, forgiveness is 
defined so that it is only accessible to those who are already able to judge well: one 
could only possibly hope to forgive if one was already righteous. 
 
Forgiveness and “the Maximal Demand” 
I hope to have shown in the preceding analysis that there are important difficulties in 
the attempt to present a refined conceptual account of forgiveness in which the 
goodness of forgiveness is unambiguously apparent.  I have also tried to show that 
there may be a discrepancy between the considerations that are undergone in coming 
to an understanding of what forgiveness is and is not, and the value that forgiveness is 
thought to possess.  Through an appropriation of the conceptual framework 
introduced in Charles Taylor’s A secular age, I would now like to comment on the 
difficulties highlighted above, and show why forgiveness may be better thought of as 
an intrinsically ambiguous part of the moral landscape, and how this ambiguity may 
itself be part of its value.   
At the heart of the sweeping account of secular (post)modernity that Taylor 
attempts is a description of an ineradicable tension within the Christian account of 
human life, a tension which exerts a greater and greater pressure as secularity 
advances and develops.  On the one hand, there is the emphasis on ordinary human 
flourishing; to put it crudely, that God is in favour of everyday life and the rhythms, 
expectations and desires that uphold it (Taylor 2007, 772-4).  On the other hand, 
although the Christian God is revealed to will ordinary human flourishing, there is 
nevertheless an equally strong sense that the fullest human desire (and calling) aims at 
something beyond this, so that for a Christian to pray “your will be done” is, 
somehow, not quite the same as simply saying “let humans flourish”.  In other words, 
there is something necessarily unstable in the Christian world-view: on the one hand, 
affirmation of ordinary human life and concerns; on the other, aspiration for the 
transcendent, which involves aiming beyond ordinary human life (Taylor 2007, 16-
18).  This picture leads Taylor to a particular characterisation of contemporary ethical 
reflection, and it is this characterisation which is of importance here.  We are, 
according to Taylor, “cross-pressured” in a particular way.  On Taylor’s analysis, the 
tension just outlined is not removed in the modern, secular move towards a ‘self-
sufficing humanism”; rather, he claims that it remains in various mutated and 
frequently unrecognised forms (Taylor 2007, 618-75).  The recognition that religious 
aspirations can damage or mutilate “ordinary human flourishing” is hugely important 
in the development of modernity, but this insight can lead in turn to another dilemma; 
how to retain a sense of the depth and mystery of human life – how to continue to 
aspire to the highest.  It may be that religious aspirations can lead to denigration of the 
body, or go along with a “hatred and rage” towards ordinary human limitations, as 
Martha Nussbaum suggests (Nussbaum 1990, 365-92), but it may also be that the 
straightforward affirmation of the goodness of human life fails to capture some of the 
deeper dimensions of human desire (Taylor 2007, 637). 
On Taylor’s account we are “cross-pressured” by the need to affirm fully, on one 
hand, and the need to aim high enough on the other, and these pressures together 
make up what Taylor calls the “maximal demand”: “how to define our spiritual or 
moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a path to the transformation 
involved which doesn’t crush, mutilate or deny what is essential to our humanity?”  
Ethical discussion is frequently conducted in bad faith, because it is easy to recognise 
failure to achieve the “maximal demand” in a competing perspective or school of 
thought, but difficult to show how this demand could be met by one’s own.  Indeed, in 
this sense, Taylor seems to want to introduce a note of tragic wisdom into ethics: 
 
We have to face the possibility that [satisfying the maximal demand] may not be 
realizable, that squaring our highest aspirations with an integral respect for the full 
range of human fulfilments may be a mission impossible.  That, in other words, 
we have to scale down our moral aspirations in order to allow our ordinary human 
life to flourish; or we have to agree to sacrifice some of this ordinary flourishing to 
secure our higher goals.  If we think of this as a dilemma, then perhaps we have to 
impale ourselves on one horn or the other. (Taylor 2007, 640) 
 
Negatively, the point is that aspiration is dangerous but essential, and that no single 
ethical insight or conceptual scheme really gets us out of this predicament.  We have 
no guaranteed way of purifying our ideals so that they no longer contain the risk of 
being pursued in ways that mutilate ordinary patterns of life.  More positively, his 
contribution is to suggest that this predicament is the realm of ethics, and therefore 
that simply pointing it out, again, cannot honestly serve as a substantive criticism of 
any particular perspective.  The challenge is not to escape these kinds of dilemmas; 
“[r]ather it appears as a matter of who can respond most profoundly and convincingly 
to what are ultimately commonly felt dilemmas” (Taylor 2007, 675).  Ethics is not 
simply the business of deciding what are the characteristics of human flourishing, 
which aspirations are most in harmony with life’s inherent potential, and then hoping 
that these two tasks will turn out not to interfere with each other; it is also the “how” 
of combining them, and of negotiating the risk that there may be significant losses (on 
either side) in the process.  The underlying sense here is that there is a moment of 
difficult acceptance involved in any genuine ethical reflection, a moment of “counting 
the cost”, and the implication is that many forms of contemporary ethical reflection 
fail to do this.     
It seems to me that Taylor’s analysis is particularly useful in understanding the 
difficulty that recent discussions of forgiveness face, particularly in terms of the 
burden of “the maximal demand”.  On the one hand, forgiveness can easily be seen as 
an ethical aspiration that fails to accept ordinary human limitations by demanding too 
much, so that people are damaged through an implied judgement of their own 
instinctively resentful reactions, and the sometimes futile effort to banish them.  Here 
the problem is that any affirmation of the importance of forgiveness may also seem to 
imply a judgement of the reactions that one thereby lets go of, and may therefore 
represent a failure to value ordinary human life.  But then, forgiveness could equally 
be seen as a weakened tolerance through which we accept too much and aim for too 
little - a failure to hold others, and by implication ourselves, accountable to our 
highest aspirations or standards.  In other words, forgiveness may be at once too 
difficult and too easy.   
Charles Griswold’s account, for all its subtlety, insight and scope, might be said to 
suffer from what in Taylor’s terms is an unwillingness to be “impaled”; a desire for an 
unambiguous, cost-free progress, or for a perfectly affirming form of aspiration.  His 
understanding of the relationship between forgiveness and resentment seems to be 
shaped by both sides of the cross-pressured affirmation/aspiration complex described 
above.  Resentment is defended because it is at once natural and moral; it is that rarest 
of things – an “is” that ought to be.  In this sense, an ethic of forgiveness might be 
seen to aim for something too far beyond our ordinary human context, and to be a 
failure to affirm the ordinary.  But then, in some cases, forgiveness itself might 
sometimes be a natural movement that should be resisted for moral reasons (one may 
be quite eager to forgive those to whom one is closely connected, or those that one 
wishes to be in favour with). It is a rigorously moral vision that provokes some of the 
suspicion towards certain versions of forgiveness (those that emphasise the gratuitous 
or unilateral aspect of forgiveness, for example), and this suspicion implies a need for 
a tighter discipline in our responses to others.  It may be, in a sense, more difficult, 
and more moral, to refuse forgiveness; perhaps, in forgiving we accept too much, and 
hope for too little.  Another problem concerns the way in which there is a disjunction 
between the concerns expressed in his account of what forgiveness is (and ought to 
be), and his understanding of why forgiveness is good.  Griswold asserts that 
forgiveness is a good because of the way in which it is a manifestation of trust, hope 
and acceptance. But this aspect of forgiveness is not brought into contact with the 
conditions that are laid out to determine what is and is not authentic forgiveness, and 
this leaves a vital question unanswered: how can forgiving be a way of cultivating the 
virtue of trust, if one only forgives when it has been established that it is safe to do so? 
There is no trust where there is no risk, but the whole impetus of the central 
philosophical aspect of Griswold’s account is structured so as to show how 
forgiveness does not take morally dubious risks.  Again, it is as though two sets of 
concerns are at work, but their conflict is never fully faced. 
An obvious response here would be that all the comments above really do is 
simply to describe the process of consideration that lies behind a detailed presentation 
such as Griswold’s.  That is, this kind of negotiation of different concerns is simply 
what is involved in thinking something through to the best of one’s ability.  We 
consider possible responses to any particular way of expressing an idea, as well as its 
inner coherence, and both of these may include combining different kinds of concerns: 
how likely is a particular idea to be motivational, how plausible does it seem from a 
variety of perspectives, how acceptable are the main lines of interpretation it allows, 
etc.  Griswold perceives, quite rightly, that forgiveness is tremendously ambiguous 
and open to both abuse and vacuity, and more than this, assumes that at present the 
balance has swung in one particular direction, so that there is a tendency towards an 
over-enthusiastic embrace of its virtues without consideration of its risks.   As a result, 
he presents an account that substantially qualifies the concept, and aims to redress the 
balance to a certain extent.  An awareness of the potentially “mutilating” nature of 
ethical aspirations - especially those that have religious overtones - may simply be a 
part of this process, and go along with a desire to present ideals and corresponding 
practices that combine rigour and hope as convincingly as possible.  However, the 
suggestion that runs through Taylor’s analysis is that these “cross-pressures” may 
adversely affect our capacity for ethical reflection (particularly when it comes to 
reacting to religious ideas), because it may mean that in the course of defending 
against certain accusations our assumptions shift, and if this is not owned or admitted 
to, it allows us to evade the possibility of confronting the real limitations and costs of 
ethical life.  What seems to be missing from Griswold’s account, then, is the sense 
that we evaluate forgiveness, and especially the costs of forgiveness, with a somewhat 
conflicted gaze.  We interrogate the subject with concerns that do not easily cohere, 
and consideration of forgiveness is one of the ways in which this conflict, or lack of 
resolve, becomes obvious.   
 
Conclusion: A Cross-Pressured Forgiveness 
We may ask, then, what would an account look like if it was more willing to face its 
own internal tension? Perhaps we might say that to affirm forgiveness, that is, to 
encourage oneself or another to forgive in the face of wrongdoing is necessarily to 
encourage the embrace of risk, rather than to platitudinously affirm something 
unambiguously good.  There is no space here for a clear outline of what this might 
look like, but a brief suggestion will have to suffice as a conclusion.  I want to suggest 
that the cases in which forgiveness appears most ambiguous or problematic are 
revealing of something essential, not merely accidental; namely, that forgiveness 
involves a reconsideration of limits, whether these limits concern what is possible, 
just, safe or fair.6  For example, in many cases (although not all), to ask whether we 
can forgive another is to ask whether we can trust them, and this is to ask what kind of 
future we are capable of imagining.  This, in turn, is to ask a rather vaguer, but 
perhaps fundamental question about what we think life is like: is life such that one 
should take the risk of forgiving.  To affirm forgiveness really is, as Griswold suggests, 
to encourage the virtues of acceptance, trust and hope, in oneself or others, but to do 
so necessarily involves risk: we cannot, by definition, know whether our “vote” will 
have its intended effect.  
More positively, it seems as though the inherent ambiguity of forgiveness also 
means that the struggle to “reason with forgiveness” may involve one in a circular 
process that could, perhaps, become a positive spiral.  As we have seen, in order to 
know what is meant by forgiveness, I have to have some sense of what kind of thing 
forgiveness would have to be in order to be a human good (the forgiveness offered 
repeatedly by a disempowered victim to an unrepentant abuser is no good; therefore it 
is not really forgiveness). But equally, if forgiveness is, in some way, good, and 
therefore has its own unique place in the moral landscape, presumably it might well 
be the case that I learn more about the good by learning what forgiveness is (perhaps 
my resistance to forgiveness is itself, in some cases, something weak and reactive). 
Something similar could no doubt be shown to be at work in the formulation of any 
particular component of moral life, but, in the case of forgiveness, this problematic 
becomes particularly acute, because forgiveness necessarily concerns moral lapses, 
failures and shortcomings, as well as – if it stretches that far – moral outrages and 
violations.  To make manifest the goodness of forgiveness, then, is not so 
straightforward, since it involves an assessment of how we should respond to our 
always-already compromised moral state.  But in this way, I want to argue, the 
question of forgiveness actually reveals something about the real heart of moral 
discussion: the important questions are not simply to do with what forms of life are 
desirable and should therefore be affirmed, but of how we are to continue to desire 
and affirm these forms of life from within the midst of the varying degrees of evil in 
which we actually find ourselves.  The question is not just “what is good?” but, 
‘starting from where we are, what is good?”  In Taylor’s terms, we can only think 
about forgiveness by noticing the near-impossibility not simply of meeting, but even 
of conceiving what it would be like to meet, “the maximal demand”.  My suggestion 
is that our understanding of forgiveness is one that is necessarily impaled on the horns 
of this dilemma.  Ultimately, though, this dilemma, and the inner tension it testifies to, 
may not be too dissimilar to that which accompanies the practice of love, as expressed 
by St. Paul: how to bear all, yet still hope all; how to accept the worst whilst 
continuing to desire the best. 
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Notes 
1. Margaret Holmgren’s Forgiveness and Retribution: Responding to Wrongdoing, also 
promises to be a significant contribution to this area.  
 
2. See Kolnai 1973, for a classic statement of the paradox here: forgiveness seems to be 
“either unjustified or pointless”. 
 
3. Compare with Jeffrie Murphy’s nearly identical definition: “A person who has forgiven 
has overcome these vindictive attitudes and has overcome them for a morally credible 
motive” (Murphy 2003, 13). 
 
4. Griswold also details conditions that would have to be satisfied by the victim, but I do not 
have the space to recount these here. See Griswold 2007, 53-9; 98-110. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
5. See Matthew 5: 44 – 5 
 
6. These suggestions are influenced by my engagement with Derrida’s notion that 
forgiveness “lives by the unforgiveable”. However, I do not have the space here to 
recount the reasons for my reluctance to embrace Derrida’s approach in its entirety, since 
these would involve a fairly complex discussion of “the ethics of deconstruction” more 
generally. 
 
